1.1 Introduction and Outline

Every assertion that we make and all explanations or theories that we might devise seem, in some way, to impinge on the notion of truth. Without the idea of truth it appears that we would be devoid of logic and our lives would be a muddle.  Our education suggests to us that if we do not accept some concept of truth we might believe, like the Mad Hatter in Alice in Wonderland, that it is always time for tea. However, I feel the need to distinguish the logical, emotional and practical need for holding of justified assertible beliefs and the urge we were educated into having about making attributions of truth. When we urge children to ‘tell the truth’ we are telling them to be honest not urging them towards any deeper philosophical insights about the world by understanding what, if anything, truth and knowledge mean.  The lack of semantic clarity in normal English about truth drives my motivations for discussing the meanings or uses of the word.

It is my pragmatic contention that we are addicted to claims of truth when even when they are unnecessary and add nothing to our understanding or beliefs. [There are of course those who take the opposite view (2).] We can wean ourselves off  the addiction to ‘truth’ by instead focusing on why our beliefs are justified. At the same time the pragmatist can view uncertainty as virtuous, because it opens up new avenues of enquiry.

Rather than adhere to the ancient idea that knowledge of the world is justified true belief, we can simply accept that beliefs and explanations that we form require some form of justification.  We cannot achieve an understanding of the world by armchair thinking alone. Instead we need to inform our views with experience of the world and by reflection on how science appears to produce theoretical statements about the world that can be considered provisionally acceptable.

A Particular Argument

The justification of ideas is, for me, much more important than arbitrary decisions about when I have formed supposedly true explanations or have definitive knowledge. I hold that the value of a particular belief, as we might perceive it, is no more or no less than what we have learned to accept pragmatically through, personal experience, education, cultural and scientific means, both as a society and at particular points in our personal development. In philosophical jargon, this view might be labelled as pragmatic stance about belief rather than truth. 

You should be warned that at least one philosopher, has seen acceptance as ‘a lesser state of mind’ when compared to an idealised conception of truth. The idea that you willingly accept some declarative proposition rather than have a formal proof that will last to the end of time is  supposedly inferior. Remember, that if you are ever a jury member deciding the outcome of a murder trial, this ‘lesser state of mind’ might be all that could stand between you and the punishment of the accused.

Epistemically, I favour a coherentist account of justification of ideas. Coherence theories stress the necessity of crafting a web of beliefs that do not contradict one another.  I accept ‘deflationary’ accounts of truth, which suggest when you have asserted that something is the case there is nothing to be gained by saying what is the case  is also true. Metaphysically, I accept the need for a form of incomplete correspondence (or relational mapping) between the external world and useful beliefs that we form. 

I do not place much store by semantic theories of truth because they seem to me to depend entirely on tautology and so do not go beyond an analysis of language or have any empirical value other than creating an understanding of communication.  However, we should not see semantics as illegitimate, for without a theory of meaning our worldview is impoverished.

My personal synthesis also emphasises that all abstract ideas we formulate and all assertions that we make about ourselves or the world around us need to be viewed in context. Since philosophers constantly invent new ‘isms’, this way of thinking is now known as contextualism and pragmatic relativism about belief, rather than the more contentious claims of epistemic relativism about truth.

Outline Part A: Truth and Pragmatism

1)  Subsection 1 includes a general epistemic orientation, notes about the uses of the word ‘faith’ and justification, and some thoughts to ponder 

2) Five idealisations of truth are examined in sub-section two. The way we use the word ‘true’ in logical reasoning, for example, requires a surprisingly detailed explanation.  I conclude that the word true is at least to a large extent logic substitutable with the concept of acceptance. Without an understanding of how induction combined with deduction facilities explanation we would be lost, since logic is indispensable in a cognitive and practical sense. In addition we should not forget that there are assumption which we all make, known as axioms, which apply regardless of our overall philosophical stance.

3) The third sub-section then very briefly mentions major explanatory theories of truth that in themselves could be (and have been) developed into separate volumes.

4) An introduction to the pragmatism is featured in section 4.  The pragmatic explanations of ‘Mills Methods’ or reasoning are included because they are  pragmatically important.  If we are to become paid up members of the pragmatist club then for me it is essential not to fall into the trap of believing that humans are unique in possessing logical abilities and  instead look at the evidence to the contrary in an illustrated page about non-human logic.

Outline of Part B: Learning from Scientific Practice and the Philosophy of Science 

Part B will deal briefly with progress in science and particular topics often discussed in the philosophy of science such as complexity, levels of explanation, emergence, prediction, verification, error and probability. My overall aim here is not to understand science in philosophical terms but instead to do the opposite; enrich my epistemology and pragmatic stance by learning from science.

Outline of Part C: Addendum

Lastly, there is an autobiographic note related to my pragmatic stance and the personal context in which I write.

Learning More

Where readers wish to pursue particular subjects in more detail, I have suggest additional reading material in books and also in a wealth of good articles in free online encyclopaedias of philosophy or other online sources such as podcasts or videos. My reason for citing Wikipedia so often is purely practical.  Wikipedia is probably a more enduring source where hyperlinks I provide are likely to function longer. Hopefully, this present exploration will make these more advanced sources easier to comprehend. 

References

1) Carroll, L (1868) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19002/19002-h/19002-h.htm

2) Overcoming the Justificationist Addiction by David Miller
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/miller/wroclaw2a.pdf

3) Blackburn, S, Truth, Britannica.com
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/607381/truth/302168/Deflationism

4) Rysiew, R (2016) Epistemic Contextualism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/

Version 3.2

Steve Campbell
Glasgow, Scotland
2016-2024
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